Pork-Barrel versus Irrelevance effects in portuguese public spending by Mourão, Paulo
EPC GP 12/74 JH 
Pork-Barrel versus Irrelevance Effects in Portuguese Public Spending 
 
Author: 
Paulo Reis Mourao, Ph.D.  
(http://www.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/paulom/ )  
Department of Economics  
Economics & Management School  
University of Minho  
4700 Braga - Portugal 
 
 
Abstract1: 
Pork-barrel effects are discussed using a specific program of Portuguese investment 
expenditures (PIDDAC) that has been observed since 1997. Our framework adds new 
insight to this important branch of Economics literature. First, our analysis is the first to 
be based on Sequential Dictators Games, which are more appropriate for studying the 
strategies of the agents involved in pork-barrel practices. Second, we examine the role 
of ‘irrelevance effects’, which limit or offset the pork-barrel effect even if the recipient 
municipality and the Portuguese Government are ruled by the same political wing. Our 
empirical estimations confirm that the Portuguese government tends to increase 
PIDDAC transfers to the municipalities that are being ruled by the same political wing. 
Municipalities with fewer residents or fewer parishes tend to suffer the most significant 
irrelevance effects. PIDDAC transfers to all municipalities were found to be more 
generous during election years. 
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1.Introduction 
 
 
It is common practice for people to compensate their friends for their support. 
Typically, people give different gifts to different friends, with closer friends receiving 
more expensive gifts. Governments and politicians behave in the same way. As 
managers of public resources funded by all taxpayers, governments and politicians are 
in charge of and accountable for a type of responsibility that is very different from that 
of ordinary citizens. Additionally, as will be discussed in this paper, such strictly 
monitored interactions have inefficiency costs that are hardly compensated by the 
private political gains earned by incumbents or politicians who exhibit this pork-barrel 
behavior. 
In this paper, the literature on pork-barrel behavior is discussed in the context of the 
Portuguese decentralized (and discretionary) public structure - the PIDDAC. PIDDAC 
has been a program that details the annual investment expenditures that the Portuguese 
government allocates for the development of specific areas. The pattern of resource 
distribution under this program is first discussed using a public economics framework. 
Based on the close fit of this framework to the PIDDAC, this paper serves as a first 
attempt to discuss and analyze this important Portuguese program in the context of the 
literature on pork-barrel effects and in consideration of factors that control pork-barrel 
effects. Until now, to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous models of pork-
barrel strategies has included these controls that are critical in terms of explaining why a 
jurisdiction ruled by the Government party might receive less than would be expected. 
Following the existing literature, we refer to these control effects as ‘irrelevance 
effects’. Irrelevance effects reduce or partially control pork-barrel effects because even 
if a given government is more closely related to a given political party, the government 
will surely not grant all the municipalities ruled by that party with the same amount of 
PIDDAC resources. Just as citizens do not remember the birth dates of all of their most 
distant friends, governments attribute different levels of importance to different 
municipalities. 
In the context of Game Theory, we realize that PIDDAC transfers can be perceived as 
Dictator Games in which government officials decide on the way in which the public 
resource pie should be distributed. Given the tendency for the government to be 
dominated by alternating political parties, pork-barrel behavior may be conceptualized 
as an example of Sequential Dictator Games. More specifically, the payoffs matrices 
associated with each municipality depend on multiple factors, including the net benefit 
of PIDDAC transfers, the political party ruling the government, and the simultaneity of 
rule (i.e., the ruling party also rules the municipality). We detail these payoffs for the 
four possible scenarios based on combining the Right/Left political parties ruling the 
Portuguese government and the Right/Left political parties ruling Portuguese 
municipalities since 1997. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the history and 
the distribution of PIDDAC resources. In Section 3, we introduce our theoretical model. 
In Section 4, we provide details about our empirical framework, the database and the 
results. In Section 5, we conclude the paper based on our findings. 
 
 
2. The history and distribution of PIDDAC expenditures 
 
 
2.1 – The PIDDAC history  
 
The PIDDAC (‘Programa de Investimentos e Despesas de Desenvolvimento da 
Administração Central’, or, in English, the Program of Investments and Development 
Expenditures of the Central Administration) was launched in the early 1980s2. During 
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 Oliveira Martins et al (2007) noted that Law 64/77 had already allowed the presentation of certain 
capital outlays in tables of multiannual programs. However, it was not until the 1980s that the 
Portuguese Public Budget Reports began to present details on program outlays consistently. 
that period, Portuguese Public Budget Reports began to include details about the 
investment expenditures directly made by the government to decentralized departments 
at the ministry or  municipality levels (Fernandes, 1984). Nevertheless, it was after the 
establishment of the first Quadro Comunitário de Apoio (in English, Community 
Support Framework) that PIDDAC expenditures began appearing as a separate section 
of the Budget Report. With the increasing role of the European Community (mainly by 
FEDER co-participation) in PIDDAC funding, the Public Budget Regulation Law (Law 
91/2001, art. 29º) stated that the PIDDAC Tables should include the related (nationally 
funded) expenditures in terms of Major Planning Options (Grandes Opções do Plano) 
and the Community Support Framework (Quadro Comunitário de Apoio). In other 
words, the law required the various costs and the funding sources, by region and for 
multiple years, to be highlighted in the tables.  
According to Law 40/83 (art. 12º, nº3), the PIDDAC values appear in table VII as 
program-based multiannual charges.   
The importance of PIDDAC distributions has increased so significantly that in the 
1990s, the Portuguese legislation treated these investment outlays as important enough 
to be reported in the form of specific and required documents. Specifically, as mandated 
by Law 8/1990, art. 8º n.2   (LBCP, Lei de Bases da Contabilidade Pública, or Bases 
Law for Public Accounting), Public Organizations are required to report to the Ministry 
of Finances all of their expenditures that have been funded by PIDDAC resources. 
Moreover, Law 6/1991 (art. 12º, nº1) brought about a special innovation by requiring 
the inclusion of PIDDAC tables in Table XI of the Public Budget Report. This marked 
the first time that the Regulation Budget Law required the separate identification of 
PIDDAC values (i.e., by its own denomination). As a result, the PIDDAC tables began 
to include details about sub-programs, specific projects, and the main localities that 
received funding in relation to their sources of funding (i.e., from the Portuguese 
government or the European Community). 
Law 91/2001 also followed the mandates in the previous Budget Regulation Law (Law 
6/1991) regarding PIDDAC. However, the previous Table XI was renamed as Table 
XV, which continued to detail PIDDAC distributions by sub-programs, projects and 
main areas of implementation. 
In addition, responding to article 75 of Law 91/2001 (or the revoked Law 6/91), the 
distribution of PIDDAC values was to be reported at the annual General State of the 
Portuguese Accounts (Conta Geral do Estado).  
Since 2001, however, Law 91/2001 has been revised: two paragraphs directly related to 
the PIDDAC Tables have been rewritten. Specifically, Law 48/2004 (article 29) allows 
the Public Budget Reports to show local implementations of PIDDAC sub-programs 
and projects by macro-regions only (NUTS 2). Although this accommodation (Law 
48/2004) has been available since 2004, the 2012 Portuguese Public Budget Report was 
the first to take advantage of this opportunity. Finally, for the first time, Law 22/2011 
omits any reference to PIDDAC and clearly identifies Table XV of the Public Budget 
Report as merely a descriptive table of public expenditures corresponding to specific 
programs (see arts. 19 and 32). 
Although the cited legislation has always required program expenditures to be made on 
the principles of efficacy and efficiency (article 19 of Law 22/2011; article 19 of Law 
48/2004; article 16 of Law 91/2001), PIDDAC values have long been suspected and 
criticized for favoring certain lobbies or areas over others. For example, the public has 
raised doubts about the efficacy and efficiency of using PIDDAC to support the 
extensive repair of one public school in a given municipality when consideration had 
not been given to a school that was built at the same time in a neighboring municipality.  
2.2 – The PIDDAC distribution 
 
As argued in sub-section 2.1, public opinion (namely, opinions expressed by the press) 
has described the distribution of PIDDAC resources as closely connected with political 
and party objectives. As shown in Table 1, the share of PIDDAC transfers is not 
proportional to the share of electors living in given Portuguese districts (groups of 
municipalities). Specifically, some of these districts (Braga, Leiria, or Madeira) 
typically have received a lower percentage of PIDDAC funding than the percentage of 
electors living in them, whereas other districts (Beja, Faro, and Portalegre) typically 
have received a higher percentage of PIDDAC funding than the percentage of electors 
living in them. 
 
 [INSERT HERE TABLE 1] 
 
The next figure presents the concentration index (Gini Index) of PIDDAC distribution 
for Portuguese municipalities since 1997. The increase in concentration since the first 
observations indicates that some municipalities have received preferential treatment 
from the Portuguese government with regard to the distribution of these capital 
expenditures. 
 
[INSERT HERE FIGURE 1] 
 
Taken together, the trend of certain municipalities being favored over others and the 
trend of increasing concentration jointly reinforce the suspicion that PIDDAC 
distributions may be caused by factors other than the distribution of electors and 
population density. In the next section, we will identify and discuss these other factors. 
Furthermore, this study of the factors driving the PIDDAC distribution highlights 
specific topics in public economics literature, namely pork-barrel effects. In fact, as 
discussed in the following sections, this literature has focused precisely on the trend of 
favoring certain regions or jurisdictions because of their political affinity to the ruling 
forces. In our analysis, we take such an approach one step further and observe the way 
in which this trend tends to be reduced in jurisdictions with limited political importance. 
In the next sections, we will use the Portuguese case to address a gap in the literature.  
 
3. The pork-barrel and irrelevance effects on a model for describing PIDDAC 
distributions using the Sequential Dictator Games framework 
 
Until 2010, the distribution of PIDDAC resources was under the discretion of the 
Portuguese government. Thus, one can reasonably expect that key restrictions were 
imposed on these expenditures. The first restriction was that the expenditures had to be 
voted on or approved by the Portuguese parliament before being included in a table of 
the Budget Report (discussed annually). The second restriction was that the 
expenditures had to be justified responses to specific capital needs in given Portuguese 
areas or municipalities. The third restriction was that the PIDDAC distribution values 
were expected to motivate appeals from the municipalities receiving the smallest values 
and generate erosion of the popularity of the Government and supporting political 
forces. However, in contrast to the Portuguese Local Finances Law (see Mourao, 2011 
for an example), the regulation concerning PIDDAC allows a larger and more 
discretionary role for the government to favor specific areas and lobbies that truly need 
help. 
 
Using the Sequential Dictator Games framework, we model the effects of the pork-
barrel behavior of the Portuguese government in the context of distributing PIDDAC 
resources to different municipalities.  
 
As a Dictator Game, a player (e.g., a government) decides how to divide a commodity 
or an amount of money with a co-player (in this case, a municipality). Whereas a 
Dictator Game is typically a unique round game, a Sequential Dictator Game allows the 
opportunity of “revenge/retribution” during a second round. The co-player receives the 
same amount of money given to the first Dictator and makes an independent decision on 
a second distribution of resources between the two players. Diekmann (2004) provides a 
discussion of these two-round Sequential Dictator Games, though the game can be 
extended to involve an infinite number of moves. Sequential Dictator Games are 
especially appropriate for Public Economics for three main reasons. First, Sequential 
Dictator Games are especially able to refresh the study of political cycles reflecting the 
alternating dominance of parliamentary systems by Left and Right parties. Second, and 
based on Diekmann (2004)’s analysis, a player in a Sequential Dictator Game is 
unlikely to offer the same amount that he/she received from the other player during the 
previous round. These unique dynamics in the Sequential Dictator Games allow us to 
study the evolution of the expected payoffs. By observing the evolution of the expected 
payoffs, we can analyze the likelihood for a player to collaborate or to harm the other 
player. 
 However, in our model, we also want to study the extent to which being ruled by the 
same party that rules the government can benefit a given Portuguese municipality. 
Based on the pork-barrel literature (Olson, 1965; Ferejohn, 1974; Drazen, 2002), we 
predict the presence of such benefits. In other words, larger amounts of PIDDAC 
resources may be distributed to municipalities ruled by the same party that rules the 
Portuguese government. However, this pork-barrel effect may be limited or offset by the 
political irrelevance of the potential recipient. As discussed in the next sections, it is 
common for recipients with a low political importance to receive smaller amounts. 
Thus, even for municipalities ruled by the same party that rules the government, the 
expected PIDDAC distribution amounts can be diminished by the low political 
importance of the municipality. These dynamics have been taken into account in our 
model.  
 
3.1 The pork-barrel and the irrelevance effects 
 
The pork-barrel literature has a long tradition in the fields of public economics and 
public finances. Following the seminal work of Olson (1965) and Ferejohn (1974), this 
literature has attracted extensive attention. The two main reasons behind this interest 
can be summarized in two conceptual expressions (Drazen, 2002): “common sense” and 
“inefficiency costs”. First, as Bratsis (2003) and Groot (2000) argue, it is not difficult to 
find classic scholars (such as Plato or Solon) who accused rulers of favoring those who 
supported the established regime in the form of land tenures, tax benefits, the 
assignment of political positions, and increases in personal wealth. Even among 
democratic regimes, the common sense perspective (reinforced by the press and the 
opposition forces) supports the claim that a party ruling a given area tends to favor 
political agents who support the incumbency or sub-areas with a high concentration of 
supporters.  
Second, following Felton (2006)’s suggestion that pork-barrel distributions are 
inefficient, several researchers (Weingast, 1984, or Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 
1981) have attempted to compute such inefficiency costs. Considering that the ruling 
power manages the public resources that are funded by the general public, it becomes 
relevant to clarify any costs due to inefficiency associated with the concentration of 
benefits on particular agents. To make effective analysis possible, the first step is to 
identify the determinants of pork-barrel behavior (Johnston, 1983). 
Hoare (1983) and Drazen (2002) have reviewed the models that discuss or analyze 
pork-barrel actions. The very first models (Olson, 1965; Ferejohn, 1974) assume that 
politicians elected by certain jurisdictions seek to obtain an initial proportion of the 
federal grants to impress the electors and lobbyists in their jurisdiction. These 
politicians are motivated by the higher probability of being re-elected if they receive 
significant grants from the centralized government.  
The more recent models (Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; McMenemy, 2001; Cadot, 
Röller and Stephan, 2006; or DeBacker, 2011) build in an additional key feature, which 
helps us to examine the costs of concentrating public benefits in specific areas by 
computing the inefficiency costs of pork-barrel actions.  
However, there have been other perspectives and insights on this theme. For example, 
Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that because public investment is a very visible and 
expensive outlay, incumbents tend to adopt a risk-aversion attitude and favor the 
projects and areas with the lowest electoral uncertainty, that is, the areas that support the 
incumbent party or are ruled by the same party ruling the federal administration. From a 
different perspective, Dixit and Londgren (1998) argue that governments will favor the 
jurisdictions that are politically most uncertain because the most politically stable areas 
tend to be electorally rigid (i.e., clearly favoring either the incumbent or the opposition). 
In contrast to the supply-side focus used by Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Dixit and 
Londgren (1998), Drazen (2002) proposes that there are reasons on the demand side that 
may explain the existence of pork-barrel actions. For instance, most electors and 
taxpayers will opt for a project whose benefits focus on their residential area but whose  
costs are shared with other jurisdictions. According to Weingast (1981, 1984) and 
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), electors tend to overestimate the benefits of 
these projects by assuming that huge local investments are correlated with the creation 
of a large number of jobs and a large stimulus of local income (Baron, 1991). As a 
result, in the next election, electors will vote for the political party that promises funds 
for their local investments. 
In summary, governments tend to favor the regions with greater political affinity to the 
majority party, that is, the areas ruled by the same party that rules the government itself. 
The electors who want to benefit from federal funding will likely recognize and vote for 
candidates of the “friendlier” party. 
Although the term ‘pork-barrel’ is widely disseminated within North American and 
northern European literature3, it appeared only recently in the southern European 
economics discourse. Veiga and Veiga (2011) analyzed how simultaneity (i.e., the same 
party ruling both the Portuguese government and a given municipality) might increase 
the amount of capital and investment transfers given to that municipality. These authors 
concluded that Portuguese intergovernmental fiscal transfers indicate a clear pork-barrel 
effect. Another southern European reference is Limosani and Navarra (2001). Taking 
the case of Italy, the authors found evidence of a strategic cooperative relationship 
between local policymakers and candidates running in national elections. The 
conclusion is clear: “In pre-election periods, national representatives try to obtain 
investment expenditures for specific projects to be spent in their electoral districts with 
the help of ‘friendly’ local governments in order to increase their popular consent.” 
Costa-i-Font, Rodriguez-Oreggia and Lunapla (2003) co-authored a discussion of pork-
barrel effects in a context outside North America and northern Europe. Focusing on 
Mexican electoral periods, the authors concluded that a positive relationship exists 
between the regional allocation of public investment and support for the central ruling 
party. In a second study of the situation in Mexico, Costa-i-Font and Rodriguez-Oreggia 
(2006)  concluded that the Mexican federal government (dominated by the single party 
Partido Revolucionário Institucional between 1929-2000) made little difference to the 
way in which public investment was allocated until the 1990s. After the 1990s, changes 
were made to the way in which the Mexican federal government distributed public 
investment, leading to the weakening of previous ‘path dependency’. 
 
However, the early literature (especially Johnston, 1983 and Hoare, 1985)4 also 
highlights the significant restrictions that may be observed in the two-way relationship 
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 See Hoare (1983) or Mourao and Cunha (2012). 
4
 The literature on the Economics of Giving (Ruffle, 1999; Mitrut and Nordblom, 2010) also discusses this 
issue. For example, at a street collection, if a giver does not believe that the requested contribution will 
 
between a giver (the pork-barrel creator) and a recipient. These restrictions can explain 
why certain givers donate different amounts to recipient agents who exhibit the same 
characteristics. The same phenomenon happens when a federal government has doubts 
about the efficiency or the relevancy of its grants attributed to a certain region. In such 
cases, the government responds by lowering the value of the grant attributed to that 
inefficient (or less important) decentralized space. Thus, the government tends to favor 
more efficient (or visible) regions (Hoare, 1985). Following Segal and Whinston (2000) 
and Khemani (2007), we refer to this effect as the ‘irrelevance effect’.  
As a result of this irrelevance effect, a municipality may receive a reduced share of its 
expected funding for reasons unrelated to political orientation (Hoare, 1985).   
 
3.2  Our Sequential Dictator Game model 
 
Based on Queller (1985) and Diekman (2004)5, we model the expected payoff of 
donation ( itpayoff ) for a given municipality i at a given year t based on the pork-barrel 
effect itp  and on the level of irrelevance ( itu ). 
That is, for each ordered pair (a,b)={Right, Left} in which a (the first coordinate) 
identifies the party ruling the government and b (the second coordinate) identifies the 
party ruling the municipality, the expected payoff is given by  
 
);( ),(),(),( baitbaitbait upfpayoff =
.     (eq. 1) 
 
Therefore, we can linearize the payoff function as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
go to support a socially approved program (such as helping orphans), then this giver tends to reduce the 
value of the contribution (Zak, 2010). However, the giver may simply not approach the recipient due to 
the excessive modesty of the recipient (for a discussion of search costs, see Kaplan and Ruffle, 2009). 
5
 Please see the Appendix for an extended explanation. 
 .   (eq. 2) 
 
According to the previous equation (equation 2), and conditioned on each ordered pair 
(a,b), the payoff expected by a given municipality i for a given year t depends on the 
constant net value K, the pork-barrel effect p, the irrelevance measure uit, and a set of 
random variables (vit) following the typical assumption of normally distributed error 
terms [iid~N(0, 2vσ )]. We also assume that uit depends on a set of non-negative6 
variables. As established by the literature, these variables are assumed to be 
independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N(mit, 2uσ ) distribution. The 
mean of this distribution is a function of vector z of the variables influencing the social 
and economic importance of the municipality7 (i.e., the national proportion of parishes 
at each municipality8, the population density9, and the proportion of elderly people10). 
To control for the opportunistic trends11 observed at electoral moments (Aidt, Veiga and 
Veiga, 2011), dummy variables coding for electoral years are included in vector z. 
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 See Battese and Corra (1977) or Battese and Coelli (1995). 
7
 To test the importance of the municipality, we constructed a set of related explanatory variables based 
on Johnston (1983), Hoare (1985), and Khemani (2007). 
8
 Each Portuguese municipality contains administrative sub-units called ‘freguesias’ or parishes. Each 
parish has a ‘mayor’, the Presidente da Junta de Freguesia, elected for 4 years jointly with the municipal 
Mayor. Each Presidente da Junta de Freguesia automatically receives a seat in the municipal assembly. 
Therefore, municipalities with a larger number of parishes may be subjected to greater pork-barrel 
effects. To evaluate this trend, we use the national proportion of the number of parishes at each 
municipality. GIven a municipality with 3% of the Portuguese parishes and another municipality with 5% 
of the Portuguese parishes, we expect the municipality with 5% of the parishes to receive more 
attention from the Portuguese Government 
9
 The population density is given by the number of individuals residing in each Portuguese municipality 
divided by the area of that municipality (i.e., number of people per square kilometers). 
10
 In our case, we consider the proportion of people living in each municipality who are older than 65 
years of age. 
11
 We also tried to control the political competition in each municipality using a common indicator: the 
share of votes received by the most voted-for party on the share of the remaining votes at the last 
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where δ is a vector of parameters to be estimated and itε  will be estimated under the iid 
assumptions. 
 
As previously stated, the pork-barrel effect p depends on the proportion of mandates in 
the municipal executive power (i.e., the proportion of aldermen) and the proportion of 
seats in the municipal legislative institution (i.e., at the municipal assembly).  
 
Following Battese and Corra (1977), Equations 2 and 3 constitute a two-equation 
system.  
 
The simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation of this system is expressed in terms 
of the variance parameters 
222
uv σσσ +=  and 
22
2
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u
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+
=
 to provide asymptotically efficient estimates. Therefore, a test of the 
significance of the parameter γ
 
is a test of the significance of the specification of the 
system (Battese and Corra, 1977).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
municipal election (Niskanen, 1998). The simplest rationale notices that the Portuguese government 
may favour municipalities where a slight shift in public opinion can lead to a change of local 
government. However, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis of statistical non-significance of 
the estimated coefficients for this indicator, for each of the sub-samples or for the entire sample. 
Therefore, for parsimony, we did not include those estimates in these tables. The complete results are 
available on request. 
Following Battese and Corra (1977)’s demonstration, our irrelevance measure for a 
given municipality i is computed as 
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4 – Empirical model, data and results 
 
4.1- Empirical model 
 
The goal of this work is to test the presence of pork-barrel effects in PIDDAC 
distributions. As argued above, these effects can be attenuated by ‘irrelevance’. Thus, 
we specify our model as follows for each ordered pair (a,b)={Right; Left}, considering 
that the expected payoff for a given municipality i is identified with the received (log) 
value of the PIDDAC amounts at year t: 
 
   (eq. 5 & 6)
 
 
 
We consider the following measures of the pork-barrel effect as independent variables 
for the first equation of the system: the (log) number of mandates in the municipal 
executive power of municipality i obtained by the ruling party of the Portuguese 
government and the (log) number of seats in a given municipal assembly obtained by 
the same ruling party, for the given year t. As previously introduced, itv  follows the 
typical assumption of normally distributed error terms. To account for the irrelevance 
effect associated with each municipality, we model uit as a function of several 
it itit itit it
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observable explanatory variables (i.e., the log of the national percentage of parishes 
under the administrative border of the municipality; the log of population density; the 
log of the proportion of the population over 65 years of age; and electoral years). 
 
4.2 – The Data 
 
The data sources for our variables are shown in table 2. 
 
[INSERT HERE TABLE 2] 
 
Despite our attempts to obtain PIDDAC data from the early 1980s, the precise values 
are unavailable in the reports for two reasons. The first is a regulatory reason. As 
previously noted, it was only after 1991 that the PIDDAC tables were required to 
present values by municipality. Therefore, decentralized values were only available 
after 1991. The second reason concerns data availability. Despite repeated requests, the 
Portuguese General Directorate of the Budget did not make the Portuguese Public 
Budget Reports and their tables available until 1997. 
 
This empirical analysis was performed using panel data. Table 3 reports the descriptive 
statistics for the following variables: the (log of) PIDDAC amounts; the (log of) the 
number of mandates in the municipal executive power of municipality i obtained by the 
party that rules the Portuguese government; and the (log of) the number of seats in the 
municipal assembly obtained by the party that rules the Portuguese government. Table 3 
also reports the following variables: the (log of) the number of the national percentage 
of parishes under the administrative border of the municipality; the (log of) the 
population density; the (log of) the proportion of the population aged over 65 years; and 
electoral years. We divided these descriptive statistics into the following four groups in 
relation to the four ordered pairs given by (a, b)={Right; Left}: 
i) Municipalities ruled by Left12 parties under a Left government; 
ii) Municipalities ruled by Left parties under a Right government; 
iii) Municipalities ruled by Right parties under a Left government; and 
iv) Municipalities ruled by Right parties under a Right government.  
 
[Insert here Table 3] 
 
In particular, following Limosani and Navarra (2001), we observed that municipalities 
ruled by the same party that ruled the Portuguese government tended to have a larger 
number of local mandates or seats belonging to that party than municipalities lacking 
similar simultaneity.  However, Chi-squared analyses precluded us from making the 
same conclusion regarding the PIDDAC distribution using these descriptive statistics. 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), this fact supports the estimation of our system of 
equations based on maximum likelihood (over other common estimators, such as GLS 
fixed-effects or the Generalized Method of Moments). 
 
4.3 - Results 
 
Table 4 displays the results of the estimations of our system using the specifications 
presented in Battese and Coelli (1995). Given that the null hypothesis (that the non-
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 The following Portuguese political movements are considered to be Left parties: PS (Partido Socialista 
Português); CDU (Coligação Democrática Unitária, a coalition whose major party is the Portuguese 
Communist Party); and BE (Bloco de Esquerda, a coalition of heterogeneous leftist movements).  The 
following are considered to be Right parties: PPD-PSD (Partido Social Democrata, the Social Democratic 
party) and CDS-PP (a Democratic Christian party). For the few municipalities ruled by Independent 
Movements (groups of citizens who were not members of any party), we considered them as belonging 
to the wing opposite to the second most voted-for party for the municipal council (for example, if the 
second most voted-for party belonged to the Left wing, then the winning Independent Movement was, 
in this work, identified as belonging to the Right Wing). 
random component of the residual, parameter γ
,
is not significant) can be rejected in all 
specifications, we can conclude that our model specifications (i.e., the system of 
equations) are acceptable for analyzing the pork-barrel effect in the context of 
Portuguese PIDDAC distributions.  
 
[Insert here Table 4] 
 
In Table 4, the results of the estimations are reported in relation to the four divisions of 
our Matrix 213. In all columns, the results indicate that our system of equations performs 
relatively well, with high statistical significance (significance levels of 1%) found for 
the estimates of the parameter Gamma (γ ) across all of our specifications. 
 
Let us discuss our first equation in terms of the variables “Number of seats” and 
“Number of local mandates of the same party that rules the government”. First, the 
estimated coefficient for “number of seats” is only significant for municipalities ruled 
by a majority of Right parties under a Right government (4th column), although Right 
governments are also sensitive to municipalities ruled by Left parties that exhibit 
relatively large numbers of Right aldermen. In contrast, the PIDDAC transfers made by 
                                                           
13
 For comparison, we also computed an estimation based on Battese and Coelli (1995)’s specification 
based on all the observations of the sample (collapsing across the four divisions), yielding the following 
result:  
ititit
ititit
ititititit
tyMunicipaliatRightmandates
GovntmatRightmandateselectionpop
densityparishesseatsmandatespiddac
εν +++
+−−−
−−−−++=
)]__*(*176.0
)__*(*592.0*218.065%*912.0
*636.0%*674.11[*747.0*167.0507.13
)116.0(
)077.0()070.0()432.0(
)097.0()569.2()099.0()145.0()866.0(
With these estimates, we can confirm the statistical significance of most of the coefficients, especially 
for the number of seats, the national percentage of parishes in each municipality, the population density 
and the electoral years. In this specification, we have also confirmed that the two interaction variables 
(the interaction of the number of mandates and the dummy ‘Right at Government’ and the interaction 
of the number of mandates and the dummy ‘Right at the Municipality’) are statistically significant, 
supporting the decision to divide the sample into four groups according to the ruling party at the 
Government and Municipality levels. 
Left governments are not as sensitive to the assembly composition of Right 
municipalities. Therefore, we can conclude that there is evidence for pork-barrel 
practices in the context of PIDDAC distributions. In other words, the Portuguese 
government increases the amount of PIDDAC resources allocated to each municipality 
given a high number of mandates (aldermen) who share the same political affiliation as 
the National Executive. 
 
Now, let us consider the second equation (the estimation of uit), which takes into 
account the irrelevance effect. In this equation, a negative coefficient means that higher 
values in a given variable are associated with smaller values of uit, i.e., with higher 
political importance (Battese and Corra, 1977; Battese and Coelli, 1995) and (based on 
the current system specifications) higher values of allocated PIDDAC14. Therefore, a 
higher percentage of parishes concentrated in a given municipality is associated with a 
lower irrelevance effect and a higher percentage of PIDDAC resources allocated to the 
municipality. Note that the latter finding is true across all cases with the exception of 
Left municipalities under Left governments. A closer look reveals that for 
municipalities with higher population densities, the irrelevance effect tends to be 
relaxed, and the PIDDAC transfers increased around legislative elections (Aidt, Veiga 
and Veiga, 2011). Finally, a special comment needs to be made for the “Left 
Municipalities/Left Government cases” (first column at Table 4): for these cases, only 
legislative elections act on or modify the irrelevance effect. 
  
Next, we construct Matrix 3 on the basis of Matrix 2 as follows: 
 
[INSERT HERE MATRIX 3] 
                                                           
14
 Following equation 4 based on Battese and Corra (1977), we are able to rank the Portuguese 
municipalities according to their level of ‘irrelevance’ in terms of the PIDDAC distribution. The 10 most 
irrelevant Portuguese municipalities (based on average values for the given time period) are as follows: 
Camara de Lobos, Santa Cruz, Machico, São Pedro do Sul, Mangualde, Alvaiázere, Cadaval, Porto de 
Mós, Vila Pouca de Aguiar, and Arcos de Veldevez. The full set of rankings are available on request.  
  
As shown in Matrix 3, other issues arise. First, if we use the same values for mandates 
and seats across different municipalities, the PIDDAC distributions tend to reach the 
most significant values in the cases involving Right municipalities under Right 
governments. Interestingly, with regard to the irrelevance effect (whose estimates are 
presented in brackets), Right municipalities with higher values for parish numbers and 
population density and during electoral years tend to receive more PIDDAC funds from 
the government, regardless of the political affiliation of the national executive power. 
 Finally, we consider the influence of electoral cycles. Following Aidt, Veiga and Veiga 
(2011), we found that the generosity of the government increased during electoral years, 
even in the case of discretionary expenditures such as the PIDDAC. Specifically, a 
Portuguese municipality can expect higher PIDDAC distributions during electoral years 
if its ruling party shares a political affiliation with the party ruling the Portuguese 
government. If not, then electoral years tend to promote an increase in PIDDAC 
distributions when the Portuguese government is ruled by Left parties. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this work, we analyzed the distribution of the Portuguese program of decentralized 
public investments (PIDDAC) to Portuguese municipalities since 1997. In particular, 
we considered the presence of pork-barrel effects and the way in which these effects are 
mitigated given the different levels of political relevance characterizing each 
municipality. 
Although the literature on pork-barrel effects has documented several cases in which 
ruling parties have shown a clear preference for areas in which the supporters of the 
incumbency are concentrated, this is the first research project to discuss PIDDAC 
distributions and test for the presence of pork-barrel and irrelevance effects. 
Our theoretical model is developed based on a Sequential Dictator Games framework. 
In discussing discretionary expenditures, we noted the benefits of modeling 
governmental behavior as similar to the “first player” of the Dictator Games, who 
decides on the amount given to the recipient player. Moreover, a sequential framework 
is appropriate for discussions and analyses on public economics by enabling us to model 
the alternation between political parties in the incumbency. 
We considered the four possible scenarios based on the combination of Left or Right 
governments that distribute decentralized investment transfers to municipalities ruled by 
Left or Right parties. The results revealed the presence of pork-barrel effects and the 
existence of irrelevance effects. 
Regarding pork-barrel effects, our observations revealed that the Portuguese 
government tended to favor the municipalities with a larger number of elected aldermen 
(‘vereadores’) sharing a political affiliation with the national executive power. Although 
we also verified the municipal assemblies’ composition, we did not find statistically 
significant results regarding this dimension. 
Regarding irrelevance effects, our findings showed that low-density municipalities with 
fewer parishes tended to be the most neglected municipalities in terms of PIDDAC 
distributions. We also found evidence for the attenuation of these irrelevance effects 
during legislative electoral years. 
This work opens up promising routes for future research. First, we would like to expand 
our database to include all the years since the release of the first Public Budget Report 
detailing PIDDAC distributions for municipalities. Second, we intend to test this 
framework while taking into account all decentralized transfers (i.e., of the current 
capital expenditures) that the Portuguese government distributes to the municipalities. 
Finally, this framework, which specifically considers pork-barrel effects controlled by 
the irrelevance level of the recipient, can be used to test other cases of decentralized 
grants, including European Union (EU) transfers to the its member states. 
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 APPENDIX – Constructing matrixes of expected payoffs that account for pork-barrel and 
irrelevance effects 
 
According to our model, there is a benefit b to a municipality when hosting transferred 
expenditures (e.g., PIDDAC). Leigh and Neill (2011) and Baron (1991) have identified 
some of these benefits, such as an expected increase in the number of jobs created in 
local markets and a rise in local aggregate demand. However, there may also be costs 
associated with the PIDDAC distribution. First, being a public program, PIDDAC has to 
be funded by public revenues, for which the costs (i.e., more directly charged by the 
government and indirectly by municipalities) can be identified as a loss of popularity, 
social claims and growth attrition (Del Rossi and Inman, 1999). Second, there are costs 
associated with the uneven distribution of this program (Mourao, 2011). Finally, 
recipient players may charge ‘preference costs’, such as ‘jealousy’ costs incurred by the 
non-recipient ‘Joneses’-type players (Levy, 2012). There may also be increased 
inspection by the donors. We are going to identify the total cost as c. For the sake of 
simplicity, let K be the net benefit to a municipality receiving PIDDAC expenditures, 
i.e., K=b-c. 
 
This benefit is increased by p, the pork-barrel effect15, which occurs when the same 
party rules the Portuguese government and a given municipality.  Following Veiga and 
Veiga (2011), p is measured as a function based on the proportion of local executive 
mandates (in Portuguese ‘vereadores’) obtained by the party ruling the government or 
the proportion of seats that this party obtains at each municipal assembly (as suggested 
by Limosani and Navarra, 2001)16. 
                                                           
15
 Queller (1985) identifies it as a synergistic effect of the Games Theory models. 
16
 In Portugal, the local power is divided into two main branches – the executive power (namely, the 
Mayor and the aldermen) and the legislative power (namely, the municipal assemblies). The local 
executive power is assumed by the Mayor (‘Presidente da Camara Municipal’), who shares the local 
executive power with a group of elected people, the aldermen (‘vereadores’). The aldermen are elected 
using the d’Hondt method, which allows the aldermen representing the party that receives the most 
votes to work with a few of the aldermen belonging to the remaining competitor parties. The number of 
aldermen is a function of the number of individuals residing in each municipality. The two historically 
 
 Based on these assumptions, the expected payoff matrix for this Sequential Dictator 
Game is as follows: 
 
[INSERT HERE MATRIX 1] 
 
This matrix means that when a right-wing party rules the Portuguese government, the 
expected payoff for a municipality ruled by the same right-wing party is rrrr pK + , 
whereas the expected payoff for a municipality ruled by the left-wing party is only 
rlK .  
 
Following Diekmann (2004), the only assumption we make is that these payoffs are 
different among themselves. In other words, we do not assume a symmetry of the 
donation, or rrrr pK + = llll pK + . In fact, there is no objective reason to expect the 
same political and economic scenario to occur when the right-wing party rules the 
government in a situation previously modeled based on a left-wing government. There 
are various reasons behind this assumption, including different phases of national and/or 
international economic cycles, changes in exogenous dimensions (e.g., financial 
markets) or new restrictions imposed by national public finances. However, we also 
assume that the expected payoff for a municipality ruled by the same party that rules the 
government will always be higher than the expected payoff for a municipality belonging 
to the opposition. In this case, we have{ } { }rllrllllrrrr KKpKpK ;; >++ . 
                                                                                                                                                                          
most important municipalities, Lisbon and Oporto, have 16 and 12 aldermen, respectively, whereas 
most of the remaining municipalities have fewer aldermen, depending on the number of residents per 
municipality (DGAA, 2012). The number of seats at each municipal assembly is constituted by the 
maximum value between two figures: the first figure is equal to three times the number of aldermen 
(‘vereadores’) and the second magnitude is equal to twice the number of parishes in the municipality 
plus one. To illustrate, the number of seats in a given municipality with 4 aldermen and 10 parishes is 
the maximum number between 12 (3x4) and 21 (2x10+1). Consequently, the number of seats at that 
municipal assembly is 21. Following the d’Hondt method, the number of seats at each municipal 
assembly is divided by the number of the political forces. 
 However, even for a municipality ruled by a given party that simultaneously rules the 
government, there may be specific sources of irrelevance that offset or control the pork-
barrel effect per se. For example, a Right government will give less importance to a 
municipality in which all 3 aldermen belong to the Right  party than a municipality 
controlled by the Left but with 6 aldermen belonging to Right. Therefore, high levels of 
irrelevance charged to a municipality reduce the amount that it can receive via 
PIDDAC, even from a government ruled by the same party. Therefore, the previous 
matrix generates a new one that corrects for the previous payoffs with the irrelevance 
effect specific to the given municipality.  
 
[INSERT HERE MATRIX 2] 
 
In Matrix 2, we impose no other assumption but an update of the previous inequality 
assumption: { } { }rlrllrlrllllllrrrrrr uKuKupKupK −−>−+−+ ;; . 
 
 
 
TABLES and FIGURES 
 Table 1 – Percentages of PIDDAC distributed by Portuguese districts (1997-2009) 
 
Average 
PIDDAC 
(%) 
Average 
Electors (% )
Average 
PIDDAC 
(%) 
Average 
Electors (%)
Average 
PIDDAC 
(%) 
Average 
Electors (% )
Distritcts (1997-2001) (1997-2001)
(2002-
2005)
(2002-
2005)
( 2006-
2009)
 (2006-
2009)
aveiro 6.22% 7.04% 5.82% 6.91% 5.48% 6.91%
beja 3.24% 1.56% 3.12% 1.45% 3.75% 1.45%
braga 5.45% 8.88% 5.28% 8.12% 3.79% 8.12%
bragança 2.24% 1.41% 2.23% 1.35% 2.90% 1.35%
castelo branco 2.57% 2.00% 2.43% 1.88% 3.08% 1.88%
coimbra 4.64% 4.36% 4.22% 4.10% 6.23% 4.10%
évora 2.64% 1.71% 2.62% 1.60% 3.44% 1.60%
faro 6.13% 4.39% 5.59% 4.00% 5.09% 4.00%
guarda 1.93% 1.64% 1.88% 1.63% 2.78% 1.63%
leiria 3.05% 4.93% 2.95% 4.51% 2.57% 4.51%
lisboa 22.04% 22.90% 21.21% 21.01% 23.36% 21.01%
portalegre 1.82% 1.18% 1.70% 1.12% 2.07% 1.12%
porto 22.59% 17.29% 21.77% 17.15% 16.18% 17.15%
santarém 4.67% 4.41% 4.37% 4.39% 3.71% 4.39%
setúbal 6.72% 8.66% 6.70% 8.01% 6.50% 8.01%
viana do castelo 2.01% 2.55% 1.83% 2.37% 1.68% 2.37%
vila real 2.16% 2.08% 2.10% 2.06% 2.87% 2.06%
viseu 2.91% 3.89% 2.84% 3.72% 2.90% 3.72%
ra açores 1.00% 2.42% 0.92% 2.30% 0.97% 2.30%
ra madeira 0.46% 2.53% 0.42% 2.32% 0.64% 2.32%
Source: Own calculations on DGO (1997-2009) & INE (1997-2009)  
 
Figure 1- Gini Index for PIDDAC distribution for Portuguese municipalities (1997-2009) 
 
  
Matrix 1 – Expected payoff considering pork-barrel effects conditioned on the ruling party at 
National and Municipal powers 
 Right Party at the 
Municipality 
Left Party at the Municipality 
Right party at the 
Government 
rrrr pK +  rlK  
 
Left Party at the Government  lrK  llll pK +  
Note: payoffs to the column player (Municipality) are shown 
 
Matrix 2 - Expected payoff considering pork-barrel and irrelevance effects conditioned on the 
ruling party at National and Municipal powers 
 Right Party at the 
Municipality 
Left Party at the Municipality 
Right party at the 
Government 
rrrrrr upK −+  rlrl uK −  
 
Left Party at the Government  lrlr uK −  llllll upK −+  
Note: payoffs to the Municipality, given the irrelevance charged to that Municipality, are 
shown 
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 Table 2 -  Variables and Sources 
Variable Source 
PIDDAC amounts Portuguese Republic Budget Report (2002-2009) 
Municipal Executive mandates Municipal Electoral results, 2002-2009 (available at 
http://www.dgai.mai.gov.pt/?area=103&mid=001&sid=003) 
Municipal Assembly seats Municipal Electoral results, 2002-2009 (available at 
http://www.dgai.mai.gov.pt/?area=103&mid=001&sid=003) 
Percentage of parishes National Bureau of Statistics (INE), 2002-2009 (Yearly 
Regional Reports) 
Population density National Bureau of Statistics (INE), 2002-2009 (Yearly 
Regional Reports) 
Percentage of people older than 
65 years 
National Bureau of Statistics (INE), 2002-2009 (Yearly 
Regional Reports) 
Legislative Electoral years National Bureau of Statistics (INE), 2002-2009 (Yearly 
Regional Reports) 
 
Matrix 3 – Estimated PIDDAC for a municipality i (log values) considering pork-barrel and 
irrelevance effects conditioned on the ruling party at National and Municipal powers 
 Right Party at the Municipality i Left Party at the Municipality i 
Right party 
at the 
Government 
imandates*7.00.17 )4.0()01.2( + - 
 
Left Party at 
the 
Government  
)2.2(
0.17  
 
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses. Check Table 4. 
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 Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
PIDDAC (ln) mandates (ln) seats (ln) %parishes (ln) pop.density(ln) %pop65(ln) leg.election
Observations 3200 3328 3036 3464 3464 3464 3464
Mean 13.316 0.989 1.477 -6.077 4.414 -1.602 0.375
All sample Std.Dev. 2.186 0.517 0.947 0.856 1.436 0.307 0.484
(1997-2009) Min. 4.466 0 0 -8.357 1.662 -2.495 0
Max. 20.229 2.079 4.174 -3.867 8.903 -0.863 1
Observations 486 578 585 568 568 568 568
Left Munic. Mean 12.807 1.367 1.853 -6.077 4.245 -1.562 0.25
Left Gov. Std.Dev. 2.332 0.219 0.825 0.887 1.383 0.319 0.433
(1997-2009) Min. 6.908 1.099 0 -8.357 1.714 -2.495 0
Max. 17.876 1.792 3.806 -3.868 8.891 -0.874 1
Observations 995 1144 978 1164 1164 1164 1164
Right Muni. Mean 12.923 0.713 1.007 -6.075 4.495 -1.605 0.250
Left Gov. Std.Dev. 2.322 0.439 0.845 0.836 1.471 0.286 0.433
(1997-2009) Min. 5.481 0.000 0.000 -8.357 1.663 -2.477 0.000
Max. 19.663 1.792 3.178 -4.297 8.699 -0.925 1.000
Observations 921 761 596 900 900 900 900
Left Muni. Mean 13.755 0.659 1.146 -6.183 4.396 -1.597 0.5
Right Gov. Std.Dev. 2.003 0.495 0.891 0.891 1.539 0.299 0.5
(1997-2009) Min. 5.891 0 0 -8.355 1.801 -2.392 0
Max. 20.229 2.079 3.135 -4.135 8.904 -0.863 1
Observations 799 846 877 832 832 832 832
Right Muni. Mean 13.607 1.401 1.977 -5.966 4.437 -1.628 0.498
Right Gov. Std.Dev. 1.966 0.261 0.809 0.808 1.290 0.332 0.501
(1997-2009) Min. 4.466 1.099 0 -8.355 1.761 -2.491 0
Max. 18.229 2.079 4.174 -3.867 8.213 -0.918 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 – Maximum Likelihood Estimations (Dependent variable: PIDDAC (ln) 
received by each municipality) 
 
 
Left Munic. Right Muni. Left Muni. Right Muni.
Left Gov. Left Gov. Right Gov. Right Gov. 
(1997-2009) (1997-2009) (1997-2009) (1997-2009)
Constant 13.906*** 17.019*** 16.964*** 25.426***
(3.802) (2.198) (1.968) (3.099)
mandates (ln) 3.760*** 0.445 0.727* 2.989*** 
(1st equation) (1.114) (0.386) (0.388) (0.832)
Dependent Variable:
PIDDAC (ln) seats (ln) -0.232 0.011 -0.031 1.462*** 
(0.458) (0.226) (0.249) (0.338)
%parishes (ln) 0.512 -0.599*** -0.643*** -1.727***
(0.425) (0.220) (0.251) (0.354)
(2nd equation) pop.density(ln) 0.291 -0.734*** -0.763*** -0.548**
Dependent Variable: (0.221) (0.140) (0.388) (0.233)
uit
%pop65(ln) -0.040 0.371 0.676 -2.103***
(0.898) (0.674) (0.563) (0.762)
leg.election -0.368** -0.455*** 0.098 -0.232***
(0.177) (0.150) (0.113) (0.087)
Number of Observ 429 961 893 745
Number of Groups 95 157 99 141
Sigma squared 3.693 3.997 2.453 4.171
(0.305) (0.348) (0.309) (1.377)
Gamma 0.533 0.464 0.486 0.755
(0.058) (0.051) (0.068) (0.082)
Log-likelihood -630.58 -1116.72 -676.81 -919.94
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses
Significance levels - 1%:***; 5%: **; 10%: * 
